



‘Divided they stand, divided they fail’  




Abstract: The literature on democratization emphasises how authoritarian constraints 
usually lead genuine opposition parties and movements to form alliances in order to 
make demands for reform to the authoritarian regime. There is significant empirical 
evidence to support this theoretical point. While this trend is partly visible in the 
Middle East and North Africa, such coalitions are usually short-lived and limited to a 
single-issue, never reaching the stage of formal and organic alliances. This paper, 
using the case of Morocco, explains this puzzle by focusing on the ideological and 
strategic differences that exist between the Islamist and the secular/liberal sectors of 
civil society, where genuine opposition politics occurs. In addition, this paper explains 
how the pro-democracy strategies of the European Union further strengthen this 
divide and function as an obstacle to democratic reform 
 






The democratization literature on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has 
recently begun to focus attention on the behaviour and actions of parties and 
movements operating under authoritarian conditions. Similar analyses were in the past 
conducted by using the theoretical tools of transitology, whose main assumptions 
were first set out in the mid-1980s in the work of Schmitter and O’Donnell,1 and 
which served as a key theoretical framework to explain processes of democratization. 
In addition to its academic value, some decision-makers used findings to inform their 
policies when ‘crafting’ democracy.2 However, in recent times, many of the original 
findings have come under criticism in light of new theoretical contributions and 
empirical evidence.3 Perhaps more importantly, many scholars now realize that 
‘democratization got stuck in many transition countries’4, requiring different 
theoretical approaches to analyse existing political systems.   
 
With the controversial exceptions of Israel, Turkey and Lebanon, the MENA stands 
out for its relative lack of consolidated established democracies, despite various 
processes of ongoing liberalisation initiated in the late 1980s and 1990s. Given the 
persistence of authoritarianism,5 it has become more fruitful to abandon the rigidity of 
the transition paradigm and concentrate on the examination of opposition dynamics 
without linking them to the ‘teleology of transitology.’6 As Pripstein-Posusney argues, 
‘there is a paucity of comparative literature on opposition strategies under pseudo-
democratic conditions,’7 where façade democratic institutions often provide cover for 
the unaccountability and authoritarianism of the principal decision-makers,8 and an 
analysis of opposition dynamics may reveal processes that the literature on 
democratisation does not appear to capture. The specific focus of such studies is on 
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cross-ideological co-operation between opposition actors. In this context, there is the 
theoretical expectation that under authoritarian constraints opposition groups, 
irrespective of their ideological positions and policy preferences, will pool their 
resources to try to pressurize the regime into reforming the political system because 
they all share the common objective of eliminating the authoritarian player to open up 
the political space. This is to be expected because it is only the removal of 
authoritarian constraints that will allow genuine opposition actors freely to put forth 
their visions of a new society. There is substantial empirical evidence from Eastern 
European and Latin American cases to suggest that such a theoretical assumption 
carries considerable validity.9 In addition, it is important to emphasise that 
international actors play a significant role in generating ‘pooling dynamics’ among 
opposition groups. The European Union has been traditionally very active in 
processes of democratization,10 by sponsoring opposition groups in order to help them 
create the circumstances for political pluralism, as the more recent cases of Serbia and 
Georgia also demonstrate.    
 
This article argues that in the MENA, contrary to some claims, effective unity of the 
opposition does not occur and it postulates that there is much more competition than 
cooperation among opposition groups. This is particularly true when one examines the 
fractious relationships between secular/liberal movements on the one side and Islamist 
ones on the other. The article attempts to explain why the MENA deviates from the 
expected behaviour of alliance-building between genuine opposition groups. The 
analysis concentrates on the Moroccan case and examines the divisions within the 
opposition not only in the context of ideological differences and tactical 
considerations, but also in light of the preponderant role that the EU plays in 
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reinforcing such divisions through its direct policies of democracy promotion and its 
wider Euro-Mediterranean Partnership framework.     
 
While there are methodological problems in selecting only one case study, the broad 
similarities that exist between many countries in the region, in terms of the 
widespread existence of authoritarianism, the presence of similar political opposition 
dynamics with a dominant Islamist current and a less popular secular-liberal one and 
the role of the EU as an external promoter of regional policies of democracy 
promotion and market liberalisation might allow for useful generalisations. Morocco 
is a good case because of the nature of its political system, based on the controversial 
concept of alternance11 implemented by the late King Hassan II. It is precisely in such 
contexts, where the previous exclusionary rules of participation have been relaxed in 
order to create a shift towards more pluralism, as attested by the inclusion of an 
Islamist party into the political system and the growth of autonomous social 
movements and civil society organisations, that we might witness the emergence of a 
unified opposition demanding significant and meaningful democratic institutional 
changes, such as the revision of the current constitution.  
    
Theoretical discussion 
Under pseudo-democratic conditions, where a degree of pluralism is introduced in the 
hope of re-legitimising the authoritarian system, it is logical to assume that genuine 
opposition actors, irrespective of their ideological and policy differences, will 
coalesce, if only temporarily, to put pressure on the regime to accede to their demands 
for more democratic change. Such an assumption is theoretically sound because 
opposition groups under an authoritarian regime are likely to suffer from the same 
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constraints on their political activities and are likely to share the same desire for the 
authoritarian player to be removed. Thus, it seems legitimate to hypothesize that such 
circumstances would lead to identifying the regime as the common, principal 
‘enemy’. This would in turn be expected to lead to the creation of some sort of united 
front, electoral alliance or umbrella organisation to deal with the ruling elites and 
negotiate or demand, depending on their strength and resources, political reforms. The 
creation of a viable alternative to the regime in place is paramount because an 
authoritarian system can survive without much legitimacy.12 Thus, in past transitions 
to democracy, such umbrella organisations were indeed created and alliance-building 
was a common feature. Acting as rational actors, opposition parties in authoritarian 
regimes for instance often form electoral alliances to unsettle the predominance of the 
ruling party and are at times quite successful, through this alliance, in triggering wider 
political reforms.13   
 
Thus, the pooling of resources is expected to take place because there is a common 
objective to be achieved and differences can be briefly set aside, as the removal of the 
authoritarian player is the most pressing common goal. Ideological differences and 
policy disputes are also momentarily set aside because if the authoritarian player 
remains in control such debates are of only academic interest. It follows that the 
assumption regarding the inevitability of coalition building among opposition groups 
carries considerable theoretical weight in the sense that it constitutes rational 
behaviour for political groups wishing to reform the existing system.14    
 
Furthermore, there is a significant amount of empirical evidence to support the claim 
that coalition-building is likely to occur when one examines the experiences of 
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Eastern Europe and Latin America. In his examination of the democratization of the 
then Czechoslovakia, Olson points out that all the opposition groups and leading civil 
society movements ‘were submerged […] in the formation of the Civic Forum of 
Prague, and the Public Against Violence in Bratislava. Both were amorphous reform 
groupings, united for the single purpose of removing communists from power. Having 
quickly achieved their goal, they as quickly lost the source of their cohesion.’15 The 
Polish transition showed similar traits as the ‘lay left’ opposition were joined by 
Catholic activists within the umbrella group established prior to the arrival of 
Solidarnosc on the scene. Solidarnosc itself was a vast collection of groups and 
individuals with different agendas, but with the common intent of removing the 
communists from power.16 The post-transition divisions within the movement, which 
led to the creation of a number of political parties claiming a Solidarnosc legacy, 
testify to the ideological heterogeneity of the movement. The experience of some 
Eastern European countries is by no means unique and the Chilean opposition was 
also able to achieve a considerable degree of unity to remove Pinochet by bringing 
together a number of different social movements and parties with very little in 
common in terms of ideology and policy preferences.17  
 
Given the strength of both the theoretical assumptions and the extent of supportive 
empirical evidence, we might expect that similar behaviour would occur in other 
authoritarian contexts where a certain degree of liberalisation is introduced and where 
there are a number of active opposition groups. Both these conditions are present in 
many MENA countries, which, at different times over the last two decades, have 
experienced some political liberalisation and emergence of opposition actors. It is 
plausible to argue both that other regions’ democratization experiences are applicable 
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to the MENA as well to contend that the region should not be treated as unique when 
it comes to social fragmentation, civil society activism and opposition dynamics. 18  
Indeed a number of scholars point out that coalition-building has been in place for 
some time and continues to characterize MENA political systems when these become 
more open, pointing again to the existence of trends found in other regions. For 
example, in Jordan the Islamist Islamic Action Front (IAF) participated in the Higher 
Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) with 
leftist and secular parties.19 In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has a history of 
striking electoral alliances with secular opposition parties as it did with the Wafd and 
Labour party20 in the 1980s,  while more recently ‘Islamists are part of the pro-
democracy Kifaya coalition.’21 In Algeria, the Islamist FIS and a number of secular, 
leftist movements agreed on a common platform of demands during the civil war, 
highlighting the proximity of views between ideological rivals on democratic 
procedures.22 In Tunisia, secular intellectuals and political parties with an anti-
Islamist ethos made a rapprochement towards Islamists in order to highlight the 
repressive measures of the regime for the international community.23 More recently, 
Lebanon experienced the emergence of an unexpected alliance between Hezbollah 
and Michel Aoun’s party.24 In Yemen, the Islamist Islah party cooperated with its 
secular counterparts.25  
 
However, alliance-building has not been deep or effective to any significant extent 
and it can be argued that it has been mainly of a tactical nature. This is indeed the 
crucial point. Alliances in MENA countries seem to be very tentative and ad hoc; 
opposition movements manage to build coalitions in order to put pressure on the 
regime on a specific issue, but the short-term nature of their accords never spills over 
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into more wide-ranging programmes for change. This is particularly evident in the 
absence of a truly sustained dialogue between opposition Islamists and secular-liberal 
and leftist movements, whose relationships are fraught with difficulties and 
suspicions. Thus, rapprochements never seem to go beyond the achievement of 
limited results, fail to be sustained over time and are consequently generally weak. It 
is the absence of sustainability of these experiences that characterizes most opposition 
politics in the MENA and it is therefore important to explore why such coalition-
building dynamics fail to be effective when, under similar circumstances, other 
coalition-building efforts in different areas of the globe consolidated successfully.26 If 
the MENA is unique in this respect, then what are the conditions of its uniqueness?  
 
All this presents a significant academic puzzle and, at the same time, poses a 
challenge for domestic and international actors genuinely interested in and committed 
to democratic change. The absence of a significant degree of unity among opposition 
movements partially contributes to explaining how authoritarian regimes in the region 
have been able to remain in power despite the legitimacy crisis that many suffer from.  
 
There are two, major explanations that focus on the inability of the opposition to have 
a more central role in the lengthy processes of democratic transition in the region, but 
they are mostly concerned with the capabilities of the regime rather than the 
deficiencies of the opposition. Firstly, as Eva Bellin argues, ‘authoritarianism has 
proven exceptionally robust in the Middle East and North Africa because the coercive 
apparatus in many states has been exceptionally able and willing to crush reform 
initiatives from below.’27 This points to the efficiency of the regimes in stifling 
opposition, which, weakened by constant repression, is therefore unable to make 
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coherent demands because it is first and foremost preoccupied with its own survival. 
Albrecht offers a different explanation and focuses his attention on strategies of 
selective co-optation, which divide opposition groups. Some opposition figures and 
movements are periodically integrated into the regime, but they are unable to 
influence policy-making decisions and are almost entirely dependent on the 
authoritarian leader for survival and for benefits.28     
 
The focus on repression and co-optation overemphasizes the material and legitimacy 
resources necessary for the authoritarian regimes to implement such strategies and 
overlooks both the strength of opposition actors and the dynamics that often 
characterize their relationships. It follows that the absence of coalition-building 
cannot solely be explained by focusing on the regimes’ strengths. First of all, a 
number of authoritarian regimes do not possess the amount of material and legitimacy 
resources necessary to effectively repress and/or co-opt opposition all of the time.29 
This is evident in the regimes’ attempt to recapture legitimacy through the 
introduction of “façade” democratic changes such as multiparty elections for 
legislatures that are virtually emptied of any meaningful policy-making power and 
autonomy. Secondly, the importance of ideology in polarized authoritarian societies 
should be taken into account. As hinted by Pripstein-Posusney, it is ideological 
disagreements that are usually to blame for the failure of both electoral and non-
electoral coalitions between opposition actors in authoritarian contexts.30 Thirdly, in 
order for the co-optation of opposition groups by the ruling elites to be successful, one 
needs to rely on the willingness of actors to be co-opted through incentives that are 
greater than the positive inducements of coalition-building.    
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Following from the previous discussion, this article hypothesizes that coalition-
building does not occur because of ideological differences and tactical considerations 
between opposition actors, which are played out in a context where the international 
dimension has become a crucial variable in how domestic political and economic 
arrangements are put in place.31 The opposition groups in the MENA are considerably 
more divided than their counterparts in other transitional countries on the type of post-
authoritarian society that they would like to construct because their belief systems are 
often very different, sometimes simply irreconcilable. While it could be argued that 
such ideological and policy differences often also characterized other societies, the 
contention of this article is that the strength of Islamist ideological discourse and its 
potential, practical translation into legislation about, for example, women, minorities 
or religious schooling, is very much perceived to be inimical to the construction of 
some form of western-style liberal-democracy, which is the ultimate objective of 
other sectors of the opposition and of the international community. While the division 
of the opposition into a secular/liberal/leftist camp and an Islamist one might seem 
arbitrary, it is analytically useful because, ultimately, the question of the creation of 
an Islamic state, which all Islamists want, is divisive and the views about it potentially 
irreconcilable. In this sense, Islamism deserves to be taken seriously as an ideological 
project. Islamists typically have a rather clear ideological script to which they refer, 
striving to translate their ideological position into specific policies, as Pace clarifies in 
her contribution to this Special Issue. It is true that there are a number of competing 
‘Islamisms’ to be accounted for, but divisions within political Islam are tactical rather 
than ideological, particularly when it comes to the objective of creating the Islamic 
state, whatever that may mean to different Islamist groups.32  
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During transitions to democracy outside the MENA, opposition parties and 
movements were significantly divided over issues related to the institutional set-up of 
the country, to the electoral system to be adopted, and to the type of economic 
development to be undertaken. In the MENA these issues are equally divisive, but, in 
addition, there is the very controversial issue of the role of religion in shaping public 
policy in all domains of political, social, cultural and economic interaction. To some 
extent, all issues are ultimately informed by the ideological position on the role of 
religion in politics. This is very problematic for the linkage between liberalism and 
democratic procedures. Furthermore, Western states are opposed to any role for 
Islamists in the decision-making process regarding the future of the countries in the 
region, as Volpi highlights in his contribution. Thus, the opposition of the 
international community to political Islam has a significant influence on how 
domestic actors interact with each other because of the resources that external actors 
can distribute in the domestic political game.   
 
A further issue to deal with is the paradox of a ‘democratic discourse’ that all MENA 
opposition groups adopt. What is striking when one examines their public 
pronouncements is that all opposition movements, Islamists included, utilize very 
similar discourses when outlining their position. For instance, in Morocco, the 
discourse of the Islamist Justice and Charity Group is favourable to procedural 
democracy33 as the only way for the country to exit the crisis it finds itself in, just like 
a number of secular and liberal social movements which claim that democratic 
procedures and protection of human rights are the only solution to the country’s ills. 
Thus, there is a rhetorical consensus on democracy, human rights, justice, 
accountability and independence, which would indicate that they all strive for the 
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same objectives and should, therefore, find it easy to come to an accommodation.34 
Such concepts, however, take on very different meanings depending on which group 
is using them and it illustrates the paradox of all groups who use a democratic 
discourse without agreeing on basic definitions of its fundamental concepts. This 
demonstrates how only an ideological understanding of their use can explain why, 
despite such rhetorical consensus, that there are no practical and concrete measures 
taken to translate it into coalition-building. This further paradox is at the heart of the 
political debate in the MENA region where opposition movements regularly accuse 
each other of ‘lying their way to power.’ Non-Islamist opposition actors for whom 
democratic political change equates with the elimination of religion from public life 
are very sceptical of the pro-democracy stances of Islamist parties and prefer to side 
with the authoritarian rulers in the hope of obtaining limited advantages rather than 
choosing full co-operation with a political player they do not trust .35 
  
Tactical considerations compound these ideological differences. In transitions 
elsewhere, it was almost impossible for opposition actors to know a priori what their 
level of popular support was likely to be once free and fair elections were called. This 
scenario does not exist in the MENA, as past elections in the region have been 
extremely significant because they have shown that Islamism enjoys much– although 
variable levels of – support.36 The same cannot be said for either the ruling parties or, 
more importantly, for the secular opposition parties. Given the poor performances of 
secular leftist and liberal parties, it should not come as a surprise that cooperation 
with Islamists is a very contentious issue for them. Most activists in the secular camp 
are convinced that Islamist movements would do extremely well in free and fair 
elections and they are afraid of the potential institutional and legislative changes that 
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Islamists would introduce, rolling democratic achievements back.37 Thus, it would not 
make sense for secular/liberal/leftist groups to coalesce strongly with Islamists against 
the ruling regime because a genuine process of democratization would not benefit 
them, but would aid a feared competitor. In this scenario, it is also no surprise that 
Islamist movements in recent times expressed the wish to cooperate with the secular 
elements of the opposition in order to secure both acceptance and some form of 
democratic legitimacy. When it comes to the Islamists’ strategy, they seem to 
consider coalition-building as a welcome development if done on their own terms, but 
there is no incentive to truly compromise on key issues given that they expect to win 
free and fair elections, which will give them the opportunity to dominate the new 
institutions.38  
 
The case of Morocco is utilized in order to analyse the validity of such a framework in 
explaining why effective and long-lasting coalitions do not occur in the country. In 
order to substantiate the hypothesis that ideology is the main variable explaining the 
absence of coalition-building, there should be sufficient evidence to demonstrate that 
ideology and references to very different belief systems are at the heart of the political 
discourse of the opposition actors. In addition, it should be demonstrated that 
references to such belief systems are not simply made in order to claim some form of 
legitimacy, but are a crucial part of policy formation. Finally, there should be 
evidence that the actions and activities of international actors, specifically the 
European Union, reinforce such a divide and contribute to the persistence of 
authoritarianism.  
 
Opposition politics in Morocco 
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Morocco is today categorized as a ‘liberalised autocracy’,39 where the ultimate 
decision-maker, the king, is unelected and unaccountable, but also where a multiparty 
system exists alongside a degree of individual freedoms. The system as a whole rests 
on the centrality of the monarchy, but political institutions and society see the 
activism of a number of different political movements and associations challenging 
the authoritarianism of the system. 
 
Morocco has always maintained at least some façade of pluralism,40 but under the 
new king, Mohammed VI, there has been a relaxation of the most authoritarian 
aspects of the regime and this has encouraged more openness and more participation 
in the political process,41 leading to the emergence of a number of outspoken 
opposition actors. Looking at the institutional level, there are a number of political 
parties that are formally independent from the monarchy and argue for changes that 
would see the introduction of accountability for the principal decision-makers. 
However political parties, including the Socialist Union and the Islamist Party of 
Justice and Development (PJD)42, have largely been co-opted in so far as they have to 
recognise the primacy of the king if they wish to be integrated into the system. 
 
Thus, it is only by looking at the broader social level that one sees the emergence of 
movements dedicated to reforming radically all aspects of Moroccan politics and 
society. It is in the realm of civil society where the confrontational attitudes of 
different opposition groups are the clearest. As Michael Willis highlights, political 
parties in North Africa are highly discredited in the eyes of many citizens and do not 
perform the basic tasks that political parties should be carrying out.43 Thus, to a 
significant extent, ‘opposition politics’ takes place within civil society and, therefore, 
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opposition dynamics should be examined in this context. In addition, the European 
Union, through its policies for the region, has explicitly designed democracy 
promotion strategies on strengthening civil society because it believes that it is only 
through increased civil society activism that democratic reforms will be introduced 
and sustained.44     
 
The activism of civil society in Morocco has been examined in some detail 
elsewhere,45 but it is worth reiterating here that there is a strong presence of both 
secular/liberal groups (among the most active organisations are women’s rights 
groups) and Islamist ones, in particular the al-Adl led by sheikh Yassine, which is 
probably the largest Islamist movement in the country.46 The level of co-operation 
between the two sectors of civil society is quite limited. On issues such as prisoners’ 
rights, there is some convergence between the two camps as there is on some foreign 
policy matters, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Such convergence is at times 
explicit and takes the form of mass demonstrations as the pro-Palestinian march that 
took place in July 2006 in Rabat.47 The potential for convergence on more explicitly 
domestic, political issues is there,48 but it is never fully exploited and divisions tend to 
emerge quickly and strongly, reinforcing the separation already in existence. All 
alliances are temporary and focused on specific issues without spill-over effects into 
more comprehensive coalition-building.     
 
The explanation for the inability and unwillingness of these groups to co-operate more 
fully with each other and establish a common platform of minimal demands for 
change is largely due to the radically different visions that they have for Morocco. 
Such different and, crucially, competing visions are the product of three 
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interconnected factors. First of all, the respective ideological programmes, positions 
and values have their roots in two systems of beliefs that seem to contradict one 
another to the point of conflict. Secondly, such ideological conflicts are reinforced by 
the activities and beliefs of external actors, specifically the European Union, 
attempting to promote a particular version of democracy. Finally, there are tactical 
considerations related to perceived strength of all actors involved. 
 
As in other post-colonial societies, two different ideological poles of reference 
uneasily co-exist in Morocco: an imported European liberal secularism and an 
Islamism based on indigenous traditions and interpretations. While this might be a 
crude differentiation in light of the surge of post-Islamism,49 it is important to 
emphasize that the worldviews and sources of legitimacy of these two poles make it 
extremely complicated to have a workable synthesis along Turkish lines, which, some 
contend, is in a state of crisis of itself. On matters related to democracy, 
democratization and human rights, these two poles of reference differ quite 
substantially. Both ideological referents claim that a ‘new’, more democratic and 
more just Morocco can be built if the prescriptions of their respective ideologies are 
correctly followed.50 Both desire radical change and wish to construct a more 
equitable society, where the leadership is accountable to the people. On closer 
inspection, the language of both is indeed similar, but the ‘content’ which is to 
constitute this ‘new’ country radically differs. The debate mainly centres on the role 
of religion in the public sphere, on which all other issues, ranging from individual 
freedoms to economic policy, depend for a resolution.  
The focus on Sheikh Yassine’s group is valid because of the dominance of the group 
within the Islamist camp in Morocco, particularly after the snubbing that the PJD, the 
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main Islamist ideological rival, received from voters in the September 2007 
elections.51 The Justice and Charity Group refuses to engage in what it perceives to be 
a rigged political system, which does not take into account the will of Moroccans. 
Judging by the low voter turnout at the September 2007 legislative elections, it could 
be inferred that many ordinary Moroccans share this view.  
   
If one examines the rhetoric of Sheikh Yassine (the leader of the outlawed Islamist 
movement, the Justice and Charity Group), it emerges that he has nothing but 
contempt for the modernity the West espouses,52 which is precisely the type of 
modernity that many among the secular and liberal Moroccans (such as Nourredine 
Saoudi, a leading civil society activist, who argues that the rise of Islamism is a 
danger for Morocco)53 aspire to. In fact, according to Maddy-Weitzman, ‘Yassine 
[views] modernity and its globalised culture as superficial and even bestial’.54 In 
particular, he rejects the notion that any political, economic and social system can be 
based on absolute rationality because ‘a modern notion of progress founded on reason 
and committed entirely to efficiency’55 is bound to lead to disastrous results such as 
Nazism and the breakdown of the fabric of society. According to Lauzière, ‘Yassine 
undertakes what can be called an epistemological and spiritual dawa, in which he 
attempts to debunk the rational assumptions that have characterised philosophical 
modernity since the Enlightenment’.56 Thus, instead of aping Western modernity, 
Yassine wishes for Muslims to revert back to Islam and the notions it provides in 
order to construct a society that is certainly rational, but where the spiritual and the 
divine also have a place because it is only through spiritual connections that society 
can truly be just and well-balanced. Such criticism of current Western modernity does 
not represent an exception within the world of Islamism and is the starting point of the 
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critique that Yassine and other Islamist thinkers put forward when analysing the state 
of their respective societies. According to them, Muslim polities have been 
bastardised by ‘occidentalising elites’ and reduced to spiritual rubble. The solution to 
the material and spiritual ills of Morocco that Yassine identifies, such as very poor 
social indicators, a weak position in the international system and widespread 
corruption, is obviously a  return to Islam and, more specifically, the creation of an 
Islamic state. In his Memorandum to King Mohammed VI, Yassine writes: ‘we reject 
all that risks to make us part way with our very own raison d’être: Islam’.57 It is, 
therefore, the ‘applied’ spirituality of Islam that will rescue Morocco with its 
principles of social justice and moral behaviour. The problem with such language and 
ideological drive is that they do little to reassure secular opposition groups because 
they are vague in terms of the crucial aspects of who is to govern society and on what 
legitimacy one is to govern. Yassine offers dogmatic certainty at a time when ‘it is 
easy to see liberal-democracy not as the crowning achievement of civilisation but as 
manifestation of a laissez-faire, morally bankrupt modernity’.58 For this he might be 
appealing to some, but appears dangerous to others. The appeal of his rhetoric should 
not be underestimated as he is the leader of an Islamist movement with a large and 
dedicated following. Despite his Sufi-imbued discourse, Yassine’s political Islam is 
quite representative of mainstream Islamist movements elsewhere, particularly when 
it comes to condemn what are perceived the most deleterious aspects of Western 
modernity and offers ‘Islam as the solution’.59    
 
Yassine’s religious discourse does not necessarily make the al Adl an enemy of 
democracy per se.60 In fact, Yassine argues that the only concrete way out of the 
current crisis is for Morocco to hold genuinely free and fair elections, which would 
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produce accountable, political representatives. Yassine states ‘democracy, understood 
as the freedom and the right of the people to choose their own government, is for us 
the only way out of the authoritarian darkness’.61 However, and this is where secular 
liberal groups again criticize and fear the al Adl, he goes on to argue that there is a 
distinction between the procedures of democracy and the corollaries to these 
procedures, such as secularization and indifference to spiritual values, which he 
strongly rejects. The endpoint of any transition is for Yassine ‘a democratic process in 
which Islam is established [in power],’62 but it is not specified how this would take 
into account the positions of those who claim that Islam should be relegated to the 
private sphere. Furthermore, Yassine seems to leave the door wide open to the 
possibility that the future leaders of Morocco might also have to invoke religious 
legitimacy in order to govern, which would, according to his secular critics, defeat the 
very purpose of democratization. After all, the King already rules because of his 
religious legitimacy and Zaghal points out how Yassine challenges the monarchy 
precisely on religious grounds, making political contestation religion-dependent rather 
than excluding it and focusing on individual rights and full, popular sovereignty.63 On 
this point, the divergence between opposition groups with different ideological 
references is very significant. The al-Adl does not yet participate in institutional 
politics and calls instead for radical reforms that would be initiated with the election 
of a ‘Council of the People of Morocco’, a popularly elected constitutional assembly 
that would discuss the future of the country and the institutional choices to be made.64 
This might in theory be acceptable to other groups, but would not solve the issue of 
religious legitimacy to rule.  
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In some respects, the positions and activities of the al Adl should not be seen as 
inherently incompatible with what secular and liberal associations believe and do, 
such as delivering essential social services, promoting accountability of officials, 
defending the rights of political prisoners or advocating genuine democratic change. 
Yassine’s critique of the ills of Moroccan society is shared in liberal and leftwing 
circles, particularly when it comes to discussing the very poor, social indicators of the 
country. The same United Nations statistics that Yassine uses to make his case for 
Islamism are also used by secular and liberal associations to highlight the problems of 
Morocco. In addition, just like the al Adl, a number of different organisations are 
involved in charitable work and are politically active in  their attempt to combat 
corruption and have human rights protected. However, the ideological references and, 
hence, the endpoint of a Moroccan, political transformation are so different that any 
formal coalition-building is prevented.   
 
Leftist liberal secular groups are much smaller in numbers than the Islamist 
associations connected to Yassine or to the PJD and are generally founded and run by 
members of the French-educated elite. This is particularly true of women’s 
associations, whose work is highly controversial in Islamist circles. Their values of 
references, are steeped in the legacy of the Enlightenment and anchored to rational, 
Western modernity, where religious values might be personally important, but should 
be categorically excluded from public policy-making. The colonial experience ended 
in Morocco in 1956, but the intellectual legacy of France is still very much present 
and while there is certainly a degree of respect for Islam as a system of religious 
beliefs, there is the conviction that there should not be ‘submission’ to it in terms of 
political positions as the Socialist party, for instance, argues.65 Thus, the endpoint of a 
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potential transition in Morocco for secular-liberal groups is a secular state where 
Islam is completely taken out of politics and privatised. The rhetorical question in 
secular circles is ‘if Islam were not excluded, how could it be institutionalised without 
a return to authoritarianism or the creation of new types of discrimination?’ For 
instance, what status would be adopted for the Moroccan Jews given Yassine’s barely 
concealed anti-Semitism?66 As Pratt argues, ‘many women’s rights activists are 
concerned about cooperation with Islamist groups because they believe that an 
Islamic state represents one of the greatest obstacles to women in gaining equal 
rights.’67 The secularists’ fear of political Islam is summed up in the words of a 
former, leftist, political prisoner now engaged in human rights issues, who stated that 
‘the vast majority of Islamists do not subscribe to the universal values of democracy 
and simply want to use the procedures of democracy to come to power and impose a 
theocratic regime on the rest of society.’68  
 
Different ideological references explain the mutual accusations that both sectors of 
civil society fling at each other. On the one hand, Islamist groups accuse the 
modernizing elites and the secular liberal and leftists groups of having adopted the 
former colonialists’ lifestyle and values, which allow them to maintain their 
privileged status, and of attempting to force these values on the rest of Moroccan 
society. On the other, Islamists are accused of intolerance and lack of sincerity in their 
pronouncements in favour of democracy and human rights.69 The tensions that arose 
between the two camps at the time of the reform of the family code or in the aftermath 
of the Casablanca bombings of May 2003 testify to these profound divisions. This 
seems to be the case because such ideological positions are interpreted not simply as 
rhetorical devices, but are perceived to be true beliefs upon which these movements 
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would act in terms of legislation if they were permitted to do so, as the legislative 
changes introduced by other Islamist parties when in power show.70 Thus, Yassine’s 
insistence on the application of sharia law is viewed not simply as consistent with his 
ideological discourse, but as a concrete, political demand, which other opposition 
groups find unacceptable because their references are not in Islam, but in liberal, 
Western thinking.  
 
If we add to this the importance of tactical considerations, it should come as no 
surprise that effective and sustained co-operation does not occur. The electoral 
advances of the PJD frightened secular movements, even though the 2007 
parliamentary elections saw them gain ‘only’ second place. In addition, the potential 
arrival of the al Adl on the electoral scene might further polarize things. The secular 
groups’ fear of electoral marginalization is a powerful incentive not to build 
coalitions.    
 
The democracy promotion measures that the international community and the 
European Union (EU) in particular set forth are highly problematic in this context 
because they simply reinforce the divisions between the two sectors of civil society, 
rather than promoting their rapprochement. The EU implements a double strategy to 
promote democratization in Morocco.71 The first pillar is trying to engage the regime 
in a series of reform processes that would lead it to adopt democratic changes over a 
number of years because of its interactions with the EU, which provides financial help 
to key reform sectors of the institutional and economic set up of the country. The 
second pillar is the fostering of civil society activism, which, building on the 
experience of Eastern Europe,72 is believed to be a necessary building bloc of 
 23 
democracy because of its ability to make demands on the authoritarian regime from 
below. So far this strategy has been a comprehensive failure73 and, paradoxically, 
Morocco is probably more authoritarian today than it was five years ago. This new, 
authoritarian turn is partly due to international circumstances, which impacted quite 
significantly on Morocco with the ‘arrival’ on the scene of suicide terrorism, but it is 
also the product of the failure of the EU as a whole to put significant pressure on the 
regime to implement serious changes due to EU preference for securitization over 
normative change, which have become even more significant in the context of ‘the 
war on terror.’   
 
Channelling aid and funds for reform through the regime’s institutions is certainly a 
mistake because the availability of external resources facilitates the task of blocking 
demands for change. However, the negative impact of the EU is much more 
significant at the level of civil society because of the fact that its policies are based on 
the perception that Islamism poses a problem rather than an opportunity. Islamism as 
a whole represents a challenge not only because of its potentially antagonistic stances 
vis à vis the West, but because it offers a view of democracy and a vision of society 
perceived to be at odds with the European experience and interpretation of what 
constitutes democracy. The values and the type of democracy that the European 
Union exports is inevitably linked to the experience and the ideology upon which 
democracy was first established in Europe, how it developed, and how it merged 
liberalism with democratic procedures. It is thus quite logical that the European Union 
provides funds to those associations that are seemingly ideologically close to its 
views, while also supporting similar values on the other side of the Mediterranean. In 
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the case of Morocco, 11 million dirhams (1.5 million US dollars) were handed out in 
2006 to civil society groups: not one was an Islamist organization.74  
 
This poses a double problem. Firstly, the secular and liberal groups in Morocco such 
as Feminine Solidarity, cannot count on as many activists as the Islamist groups and 
hence the people involved constitute a minority of those who are politically active in 
opposition. In addition, the accusation of being anti-Islamic for the work they do 
(caring for single mothers) further puts pressure on them and their operations.75 
Secondly, the EU does not only promote democracy, but pursues other objectives, 
such as the economic integration of Morocco into a free trade area, which may further 
impoverish ordinary Moroccans.76 Thus, the beneficiaries of European support expose 
themselves to the criticisms of Islamists because they not only import ‘un-Islamic’ 
values, but also because by their activism they arguably contribute to the country’s 
continuing poverty. In sum, support of only a certain sector of the opposition and 
close interaction with the regime make the EU a problematic actor rather than a 
facilitator of genuine democratic change.  
 
In addition, the European Union refrains from engaging with Islamists. By 
implication, this labels Islamists as ‘undesirable’, as if they had nothing to contribute 
to the pro-democracy debate and were not the potential representatives of the majority 
of Moroccans. The popularity of Islamism is evident, but the EU ignores it and treats 
political Islam solely as challenge. Thus, the EU prefers to either cosy up to the 
regime or only deal with opposition movements that largely share the same values, 
forgetting that such values, in the eyes of many, ordinary Moroccans, simply 




The inability and the unwillingness of European policy-makers even to conceive of 
the possibility that an alternative might exist to liberal democracy such as an Islamic 
one reinforces the domestic divisions among opposition groups in Morocco and, while 
the intervention of the international community is welcomed by the secular/liberal 
groups, it is resented by Islamists. As the spokesperson of the al Adl argued, ‘there is 
fundamentalism today in the West’,78 by which he implied that there is a strong bias 
against Islamists and Islam.  
 
Conclusion 
During processes of liberalization it might be expected that opposition groups, 
irrespective of their differences, would coalesce to achieve the one, common objective 
that stops them from operating freely: the institutional elimination of the authoritarian 
gate-keeper. The expectation was confirmed in a number of cases in the transitions of 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, but such sustained co-operation does not seem to 
characterize the MENA. There is a degree of co-operation on some specific issues, 
but there is no formalized coalition. The absence of such co-operation in the case of 
Morocco is all the more surprising because of a tradition of limited, political pluralism 
and the presence of Islamist movements that have either been institutionalised, the 
PJD, or have strongly committed themselves to change through peaceful means, the al 
Adl.  
 
The divisions are particularly strong between secular, liberal leftist groups engaged in 
democratisation and human rights and Islamist associations connected to the al Adl 
and the PJD. The explanation for the absence of formal coalitions between the two 
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sectors rests on three interconnected factors. First of all, the ideological divide 
between the two sectors of society is so significant that they fear each other more than 
they fear the continuation of authoritarian rule. The strength of Islam as an ideological 
reference frightens secular and liberal groups, just as the attachment of the latter to the 
values of the Enlightenment and European modernity unsettles Islamists. The 
ideological divide is so profound that both sectors are aware of the fact that specific, 
probably unwelcome, policies would flow from such ideological stances and they are 
not prepared to accept each other’s potential victory were the rules of the game 
modified. Secondly, the democracy promotion strategies of the European Union and 
of its member states reinforce such a divide because they promote only a very 
exclusivist understanding of democracy, which is appealing only to one sector of 
society and not to the other. Funding follows for those who already have accepted and 
internalised the values of liberal-democracy, thereby excluding Islamism and its 
representatives. Finally, tactical considerations play a role insofar as the perception of 
who will benefit from genuine democratisation impedes coalition-building and 
entrenches positions. The historical experience of Iran, where leftists, liberals and 
Islamists co-operated to overthrow the Shah, is a precedent that secular groups might 
not wish to repeat given the final outcome of the revolution.   
 
These divisions suit the authoritarian leader, who is able to play one sector of the 
opposition against the other depending on the issue and is thereby able to remain the 
sole and unaccountable arbiter of the political system by carefully managing 
repression and co-optation. For the international community, this is quite a positive 
outcome as stability is guaranteed; for the secular, liberal opposition, a degree of 
influence is also guaranteed as long they ultimately rally to the regime; and for 
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Islamists, the current situation is akin to the continuation of colonial rule by an 
indigenous elite, although some sectors of institutionalized Islamism benefit from co-
optation.  
 
The Moroccan case is quite paradigmatic of trends that exist elsewhere in the MENA. 
Divisions within civil society remain prominent in Egypt, Jordan and Algeria, leading 
authoritarian regimes to successfully implement policies of ‘divide and conquer’. 
Through its policy instruments, the European Union provides the ideal, external 
support for the continuation of such divisions, leading Islamists to increasingly lose 
hope that the EU might be different from the United States. Civil society dynamics 
are an important indication of the nature of political relationships within any polity. 
When it comes to the MENA, such relations are fraught with difficulties and 
suspicions, leaving one quite pessimistic about the possibility of civil society being a 
driving force for democratic transformation.      
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